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The present paper extends the theory of self-enforcing agreements in a long-term relationship 
(the Folk Theorem in repeated games) to the situation where agents change their partners over 
time.  Cooperation  is sustained  because  defection  against one  agent causes sanction by others, 
and the paper shows how such a "social norm" is sustained by self-interested agents u-der various 
degrees of  observability.  Two main results are presented.  The first one  is an example  where a 
community can sustain cooperation even when each agent knows nothing more than his personal 
experience.  The second  shows  a  Folk  Theorem that the  community  can realize any mutually 
beneficial outcomes  when each agent carries a label such as reputation, membership, or licence, 
which are revised in a systematic way. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognized that in many economic transactions, informal means are employed 
to  execute  mutually beneficial  agreements.  As  S. Macaulay  (1963)  points  out,  "social 
pressure" and  "reputation" are perhaps  more widely  used  than formal contracts and 
filing suits.  In many cases, people  behave honestly because honesty is rewarded and/or 
defection  is punished  in future transactions. 
Such informal enforcement mechanisms can be classified into two categories.  One 
is  personal  enforcement, in  which  cheating  triggers retaliation  by  the  victim.  These 
mechanisms are effective only if quick and substantial retaliations are available-that  is, 
they work best in frequent and long-term relationships.  The Folk Theorem in the repeated 
game literature (Rubinstein (1979) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)) provides a formal 
model  of personal  enforcement, showing  that any mutually beneficial outcome  can be 
sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium if the same set of agents frequently play the 
same stage game ad infinitum. However, many important transactions are infrequent in 
nature.  As  economic  historians  argue, the  division  of  labour  and  specialization  are 
important  driving  forces  of  economic  progress.  Potential  gains  are larger in  diverse 
transactions with different specialists than with fixed partners. Therefore, the control of 
incentives in such an infrequent trade is of vital importance to understand the organization 
of  economic  transactions.  This  observation  leads  to  the  second  category of  informal 
enforcement  mechanisms,  community enforcement, where  agents  change  their partners 
over time and dishonest behaviour against one partner causes sanctions by other members 
in the society.  The present paper is devoted to the study of such mechanisms. 
The specification of desirable behaviour together with sanction rules in a community 
may be regarded as a social norm, and we analyze how such social norms work to support 
efficient outcomes in infrequent transactions. Our approach to this problem assumes the 
standard axiom  of  economics  that agents only  care about their own utility; that is, we 
do not assume that people  follow  a social norm for its own sake, but we investigate how 
such a rule is sustained by self-interested community members.  For a social norm to be 
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sustainable, it must provide proper incentives to the members in every respect.  Thus, not 
only are deviators from the desired behaviour punished, but a person who fails to punish 
is in turn punished.  In other words, we will investigate the (subgame-perfect or sequential) 
equilibria of the game played by community members. 
In small communities where members can observe each other's behaviour, community 
enforcement works in much the same way as personal enforcement.  We can easily modify 
the usual Folk Theorem to show that any efficient and individually rational outcome can 
be sustained when there are frequent interactions among the community members as a 
whole,  and  this  is  true even  if  the  transactions  among  any  given  pair  of  agents  are 
infrequent.  This observation shows that changing partners itself is unimportant and the 
crux of the matter is information transmission among the community members.  Given 
this, we  propose  the following  research programme: What is the minimal information 
transmission necessary to sustain efficient outcomes  by community enforcement?  As a 
first step to answer this question, the present paper shows what a community can achieve 
under various degrees of observability. 
When the  observability  is  not  perfect,  each  agent  typically  possesses  a  piece  of 
information about the history of trades in the community which may not be known to 
others.  The  presence  of  such  private  information  characterizes the  main  theoretical 
difference between  our models  and the models  of  standard repeated games, where all 
relevant information is assumed to be common knowledge among all agents in the game.' 
We encounter new problems  and the analysis of such games turns out to be a non-trivial 
extension  of  the  usual  repeated  games.  The  source  of  difficulty is  illustrated  by  the 
following  observation.  Suppose the community can somehow  "mark" deviators, say, by 
putting dark spots  on their foreheads,  and suppose  that the community norm requires 
that an agent should cooperate if and only if the partner is unspotted.  Now consider the 
agents'  incentives  to  follow  the  norm.  Clearly,  no  one  wishes  to  deviate  from  the 
equilibrium path if the punishment is severe enough.  To show that this social  norm is 
an equilibrium, however, we must also show that everybody has incentives to follow the 
norm  after any  history.  Consider  two  unspotted  players  matched  to  each  other,  and 
suppose  that one of them is likely to encounter many spotted partners in the future.  If 
the punishment is costly to carry out, this may destroy the incentives for them to cooperate, 
because one of them doesn't have enough stake in the future.  And just as in any games 
with private information, their incentives  depend  on how this information is known to 
them, which is determined by their personal experiences (for example, how many deviators 
each of them has seen and when they were observed).  Checking incentives and specifying 
equilibrium behaviour  in those  cases  can potentially  be very complicated,  because  (i) 
private information (what the players have observed) and its distribution will be increas- 
ingly complicated  over time, and (ii) the players' private information do not come from 
a common  prior distribution after deviations  occur.  Those  points  show that the game 
does  not have the usual recursive structure which is possessed  by the standard models 
of repeated games with public information.  The analysis of models with public informa- 
tion is greatly simplified because after any history the continuation strategies correspond 
to  an equilibrium in the  original game  (see  Abreu,  Pearce and  Stacchetti (1990)).  In 
contrast, in our model continuation strategies correspond to a part of (partially) correlated 
1. See the papers on the Folk Theorems under perfect information cited above, as well as the literature 
on repeated games with imperfect monitoring which assumes that the signal in the game is publicly observed 
by all players (Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990), Green and Porter (1984),  Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin 
(1989),  Kandori  (1989)).  A recent paper by  Fudenberg and  Levine (1991)  deals  with the case  of  privately 
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equilibrium where the correlation device  is the private observation of the past history. 
Point (i) above says that the distribution of the correlation device is non-stationary and 
point  (ii)  says that the players do  not  share the  same prior of the  correlation device. 
Hence it is not obvious  if the seemingly straightforward social norm described above is 
in fact an equilibrium; players' behaviour off the equilibrium may need to be modified, 
and the modifications  can be highly complicated. 
The paper presents two main results. The first one is an example where a community 
can sustain cooperation  even when each agent only observes the results of the trades he 
engaged in.  An agent knows what his partners did to him, but he does not observe their 
identity  nor  what  they  have  done  to  other  agents.  We  show  that  even  in  that  case, 
cooperative behaviour can sometimes be sustained.  The social norm supporting cooper- 
ation  in  such  a  situation  uses  a  contagious  process  of  defection,  and  the  scope  and 
limitations  of  such  a social  norm will be discussed.  The second  results gives the Folk 
Theorem under mild assumptions, assuming the existence  of a mechanism or institution 
which processes a certain class of information honestly.  Being interested in the minimal 
information dissemination,  we put the following  restrictions on the form of information 
transmission. 
1. A label is attached to each agent. 
2.  Before executing trade each agent observes his and his partner's label. 
3.  A player and his partner's actions and labels today determine their labels tomorrow. 
Requirement 2 says that each agent has only local knowledge  of the current state of the 
community,  and  requirement 3  indicates  that the  revision  of  labels  does  not  require 
knowledge of the entire society, and allows the information processing to be potentially 
decentralized.  Reputation,  membership, citizenship,  social  status, and credit cards can 
be regarded as examples of this class of information transmission mechanisms.2 We show 
how such an information processing device, which does not have any enforcement power 
of its own, facilitates community enforcement of efficient trade.  These mechanisms are 
studied in the pioneering work by Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1989) and they show 
that the Folk Theorem holds in a random matching game when such information trans- 
mission  is  available.  However,  as  we  have  seen,  the  presence  of  private information 
complicates  the  analysis,  and  to  overcome  this  difficulty they  either  assume  infinite 
population and uniform random matching (where no one expects to meet a defector after 
any finite number of deviations),  or employ an equilibrium concept which is weaker than 
sequential  equilibrium. Under mild assumptions  on the payoff functions,  however, the 
present paper proposes  a simple strategy profile which defines an exact (i.e. sequential) 
equilibrium for any population  size and matching rule, but still is able to support any 
feasible  and  individually  rational payoffs.  The  equilibrium  reveals the  importance  of 
such notions  as repentance and forgiveness in social norms. 
The  role  of  information  in  matching  games  is  also  analyzed  by  Rubinstein  and 
Wolinsky (1990) in a different context.  In their model, buyers and sellers are randomly 
matched,  and once  a seller and a buyer agree to trade, they leave the market.  So the 
structure of their model is different from repeated games, but they derive results which 
are  similar in  flavour to  ours.  Their  analysis  shows  that  if  each  player  has  enough 
2.  The following  may be helpful to motivate the reader who is familiar with the dynamic programming 
decomposition  of repeated games (See Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990)).  If we treat the whole  matching 
game as a huge repeated game with all community members, continuation payoffs serve as labels summarizing 
all relevant information about the past history, if each player can observe all players' labels and the revision 
of each label can depend on the actions and labels of all players.  The question is whether we can find something 
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information  about  other  players'  history,  there  exist  many  equilibria  which  are  not 
sustained when such information is unavailable. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces the formal model of repeated 
matching games.  Section 3 shows that community enforcement works in much the same 
way as personal enforcement under public observability. Section 4 provides an example 
where a community can sustain an efficient outcome even when each agent observes the 
history of his transactions only.  Section 5 deals with the Folk Theorem when labels are 
attached to agents. The final section discusses the related literature and possible extensions 
of our model. 
2.  REPEATED  MATCHING  GAMES 
The basic structure of the repeated matching game is described as follows.  The set of 
players  N = {1, ..  , 2n}  is partitioned  into  two  sets  of  equal  size,  N1 = {1,...,  n}  and 
N2 = {n .1...  .,  2n}, where Nk  is the set of type-k players (k =  1, 2).  In each stage, each 
type-1 player is matched with a type-2 player according to some matching rule, and they 
play a two-player  stage game.  This procedure is repeated infinitely and each  player's 
total payoff is the expected  sum of  his stage payoffs discounted  by  8 E (0, 1).  Most of 
the results in this paper do not depend  on the way players are matched.  For example, 
they can be endogenous  and history-dependent. Let ,(i,  t) be player i's match at time t. 
For some cases, we assume uniform random matching in which 
Prob {,u(i, t) =j}  = 1/n  for all i E N1 and j e N2 and for all t 
and the matching in each stage is independent.  The stage game is described by a payoff 
function g: A -  lR2,  where A = A1 x A2 and Ak  is the finite set of actions for type-k players 
(k = 1, 2).  The minimax point M1 E A for type-1 players is defined by 
Me E  arg mina2cA2  (maxaleAl  g1(a1, a2)) 
Ml E arg maxa1eAl  g1(al,  M') 
and M2 is defined similarly.  For simplicity, the "mutual minimaxing point" (M2, Ml) 
is denoted  by m =  (ml,  M2).  We normalize the payoffs in such a way that the minimax 
payoffs  are  equal  to  zero  (g1(M')  =  g2(M2) = 0).  Finally,  the  set  of  feasible  and 
individually rational payoffs in the stage game is defined by 
V = {v e cog (A) I  v >>  O}, 
where cog (A)  is the convex hull of the set g(A). 
3.  FOLK  THEOREMS  UNDER  PUBLIC  OBSERVABILITY 
We first point  out that, if  all agents' past actions  are publicly  observable,  every point 
v E V is sustained by a perfect equilibrium, even when agents change their partners over 
time.  Perhaps the simplest way to prove the assertion is to utilize the same strategies as 
the Folk Theorem for two-player repeated game. 
Proposition 1.  If v E V is supported  by an equilibrium  in the two-player  repeated game 
for some 8, then it is also supported by an equilibrium  in the matching game for  the same 
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The point  of this assertion is that the same  8 works for any population  and matching 
rule; under public observability, each agent has as strong an incentive to cooperate as if 
he faced the same partner in each period.  This is true even when the chance of meeting 
the same partner in the future is very small, or even zero. 
Proof.  The players in the matching game start by playing the equilibrium path of 
the two-player game.  If the type-i player deviates (1= 1, 2), all type-I's are punished by 
all  of the other type, using the same punishment strategies as in the two-player game. 
The same principle  applies  to  any further deviations,  and simultaneous  deviations  are 
ignored.  Then, it is clear that the incentives  of each player are identical with those  in 
the two-player game because each player encounters the same sequence of action profiles 
as in the two-player  repeated game, only the opponents being changed over time.  Hence 
the prescribed strategies are in fact a perfect equilibrium.  11 
In the  above  proposition,  an equilibrium is constructed where a large number of 
innocent players are held responsible for the deviation of a defector.  Since punishment 
never occurs on the equilibrium path, this does  not entail actual welfare loss,  but such 
an  equilibrium is  intuitively  unappealing.  If  only  the  deviator is to  be punished  and 
innocent  pairs are to  play the originally prescribed actions,  however, more conditions 
are  necessary  to  achieve  subgame  perfection.  As  was  discussed  in  the  introduction, 
difficulties may  arise in providing  incentives  for  innocent  players  after some  players' 
defections. To maintain the faith of innocent agents, we have to avoid the situation where 
too  much burden of punishment is imposed  on them.  Such a situation arises when the 
community  is  highly  populated  with  "guilty" agents,  or the  matching  is  highly  non- 
uniform.  Introducing  some  "forgiveness"  in  the  social  norm,  we  can  avoid  the  first 
problem. 
Proposition 2.  Under uniform random matching, any payoff point v E V is sustained 
by an equilibrium  where only defectors are punished, if 8 E (8*, 1), where 8* can be chosen 
independently of the population size. 
Remark.  Without the independence  of population,  the statement would  be trivial 
because personal retaliations may be effective when players are very patient. 
Proof.  Let a* E A be the action profile achieving the payoff v.  On the equilibrium 
path, action profile a* is played.3  If a player deviates from the equilibrium path, he and 
his opponents  will play mutual minimax m for T periods and then revert to the original 
actions  a*.  Meanwhile,  all the  other players keep  on  playing  a*.  When the deviator 
defects  while  he  is punished,  the  T-period punishment  is  restarted.  If another player 
deviates when  a player is punished,  the former deviator is forgiven and  only the latest 
deviator is punished.  Simultaneous deviations are ignored. 
Let x = g(m)  and define the average punishment payoffs 
V=(1  8  )x+8  v. 
Choose  8T  E (0,  1)  so that V >>  0.  Then, no player deviates when he is punished, because 
he can earn at most 0+  8Vk (k = 1, 2) by a deviation, which is less than the original payoff 
Vk. 
3.  Or use a correlated strategy if necessary, and assume that the corelation devices are observable.  The 
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When a type-k player (k = 1, 2) is innocent,  his average payoff is at least 
fl  =  (1  -  8)Xk  +  (S-  _T)[(1  -  1/n)vk  +  (1/n)xk]  +  8TVk, 
while by a deviation he receives at most 
I  =  (1  -8)Vk  + 8Vk, 
where v* = maxa A gk(a).  As 8  1  I with  ST  held constant, 
Hj-H_-I  (1-_  T)(1  -  1/n)(vk  -Xk)  >  0, 
and therefore the  deviation  is unprofitable.  Since the  difference HI-IH' is smallest for 
n = 2, the lower bound on  8 for n =  2 works for all larger n.  11 
Those assertions show that under public observability it is unimportant who punishes 
the  defector;  community enforcement  works just  as well  as personal retaliation in the 
usual repeated games.  In this sense,  observability in the community is a substitute for 
having a long-term frequent relationship with a fixed partners. 
4.  COOPERATION  WITHOUT  INFORMATION  PROCESSING 
This  section  analyzes  an  example  where  very  limited  observability  is  svailable,  and 
illustrates what kind of  difficulty a community confronts in such a case.  The example 
shows the ability and limitations of social norms with very little information, which helps 
to explain why a community needs a certain amount of information to sustain its norms. 
In this section, the stage game is assumed to be the prisoner's dilemma game described 
by Table 1. 
C  d 
C  1,1  -i,1+g 
d  i+g,-i  0,0 
TABLE  1 
The numbers g (the gain from defection)  and I (the loss when cheated) in the above 
table are positive,  and action c stands for cooperation  and d  stands for defection.  The 
first number in each entry indicates the row player's payoff and the second is the column 
player's.  Since the game is symmetric, assume  n pairs are formed randomly out of 2n 
players without any distinction between type-I  and type-2.  For notational convenience, 
let M = 2n denote the population  size. 
We consider the case in which each player observes only the history of action profiles 
in the stage games which he has played.  In this situation, a player knows nothing about 
the  identity  of  players  or  what  has  gone  on  in  the  rest  of  the  community.  Direct 
communication  among the players is assumed to be non-existent.  We call this case  no 
information  processing.  In this situation, there is no way to implement the equilibria in 
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retaliation is not available either. One may further conjecture that the only equilibrium 
is the repetition of the Nash equilibrium in the stage game.  However, we will show that 
the  community  may  sometimes  still  sustain  cooperation  by  what  may  be  called  the 
'contagious  equilibrium". 
The idea of the "contagious equilibrium" is that trust is attached to the community 
as a whole, not to each individual.  Therefore, a single defection by a member means the 
end  of  the  whole community trust, and  a player who  sees  dishonest  behaviour  starts 
cheating  all  of  his  opponents.  As  a  result,  defection  spreads  like  an  epidemic  and 
cooperation  in  the  whole  community  breaks  down.  We  are going  to  show  that this 
somewhat peculiar social norm is indeed justified as a sequential equilibrium of the game.4 
To describe the equilibrium conditions,  let us introduce the "types" of players.  A 
player is of  type c if nobody  has  deviated  in the past history of  his stage games,  and 
otherwise he becomes  type d.  This means that, once  a player cheats or is cheated,  he 
becomes  type  d  for good.  The equilibrium is described by a simple rule; each player 
chooses  the action which is equal to his type. 
Theorem 1.  Under uniformly random matching, the contagious strategy described 
above constitutes a sequential equilibrium strategy for  any given g and M  if 8  and 1 are 
sufficiently  large. 
Remark.  If a player can believe that a large number of players have already been 
cheated whenever he seees a defection,  then it is in his best interest to defect forever, as 
is prescribed by the contagious strategy. This system of beliefs, however, is not consistent 
in the sense of  Kreps-Wilson  (1982)5so that it is not compatible with sequential equili- 
brium.  For example, if a player sees a defection  in the first period, he must believe that 
everybody else  is cooperating, because  the definition of  consistent beliefs  requires that 
defections  by different players are statistically independent.  By the same token, when a 
player defects when he has seen no defection, he must believe that he is the first person 
to defect in the society.  Therefore, checking the incentive to follow  contagious process 
of defection  is a non-trivial problem. 
The intuition  of  Theorem  1 is straightforward.  When a player defects,  his future 
payoffs are destroyed by the contagious process of defection.  The loss of future payoffs 
outweighs the instantaneous gain if the player does not discount the future payoffs much. 
Hence  a player never deviates from the equilibrium path if  8 is close to unity.  On the 
other hand, once the contagious process has started, a player faces the following trade-off. 
If a player chooses  c rather than d, he can slow down the contagious  process to enjoy 
high payoffs in the future. However, playing  c is costly in terms of instantaneous gain. 
In particular, there is always a possibility  of meeting a d-type,  in which case playing c 
induces  loss  l.  Therefore, if  1 is large enough,  it is in a player's best interest to follow 
the contagious process once it has started. 
To derive the formal equilibrium conditions,  let us introduce some notation.  Let X, 
be the number of type d players at time  t, and define the M x M transition probability 
4.  Harrington (1989) independently  discovered a similar equilibrium in the case of Poisson matching in 
continuous  time. 
5.  A system of beliefs is consistent if it is derived by the following procedure.  First, perturb each player's 
strategy so that all actions are taken with positive  probabilities.  The perturbation of strategies is required to 
be independent  across players and over time.  Then we can unambiguously  define the beliefs by Bayes' rule, 
because all information sets are reached with positive probabilities.  Finally, take the limit of the beliefs as the 
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matrix  A=(aij)  where  aij=Prob(Xt?1=jjX,=i).  Also  define  B=(bij)  by  bij= 
Prob (X,+1 = j I  X, = i and one of the d-types deviates to play c at time t), and let H = B -  A. 
Matrix H  indicates  how the diffusion of  d-types  is delayed  by unilateral deviation  of 
one of d-types.6  The probability that a d-type player encounters a c-type is summarized 
by a column vector, 
pM  (M-1,M-2,...,1,0)T 
where the  ith element  of  p  is the conditional  probability that a d-type  player meets a 
c-type when there are i d-types.  Finally, ei stands for 1 x M vector whose  ith element is 
1 with zeros everywhere else.  With this preparation, the formal equilibrium conditions 
are given as follows. 
Lemma.  The contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium  if 
1'  (1-  )e,(I-BA)-lp  (1) 
1+g 
and 
M  k  g +  -  I 
\ M  11+  /  ?ekH(I-8A)-Yp  for  k=2,3,...,M.  (2) 
The proofs of Theorem 1 and the Lemma are given in the Appendix. 
Note  that the  contagious  equilibrium is more effective at deterring defection  than 
personal retaliation, where a defector is punished  only by the person he cheated.  This 
is because under the contagious  equilibrium a defector not only loses  cooperation  with 
the victim, but also  some of the future payoffs with other players are destroyed by the 
contagious  process.  More  precisely,  if  (g, 6)  is  such  that  a  player is just  indifferent 
between cooperating and cheating under personal retaliation, he strictly prefers to cooper- 
ate under the contagious equilibrium.  Since the incentive to start the contagious process 
(the inequality  (2))  can be maintained  when being cheated  is costly  (when  1 is large), 
there are situations in which cooperation is sustained by the contagious equilibrium, but 
not by personal retaliation. 
There are two  things going  on  in  this  equilibrium; information  transmission  and 
punishment.  A player who was cheated  starts cheating,  which has the effect of  telling 
the other members that someone  has deviated, and of punishing the cheater who cannot 
be identified.  The players have positive incentives to follow  such behaviour because the 
community trust will completely  break down  sooner  or later irrespective of  his action, 
so that there is no point in sticking to honest behaviour (see condition  (2)).  As a result, 
quick breakdown of community trust occurs after a deviation in a self-enforcing way. 
Three points should be noted about the limitations of social norms under no informa- 
tion processing: 
(1)  The above social norm does not have as much cheating deterrence power as the 
community  enforcement  under  perfect  information,  because  a  cheater  is  not 
punished  immediately.  And  the  conditions  for  sustaining  cooperation  under 
6.  For the closed  forms of A and H, see the original version of this paper (CARESS working paper No. 
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perfect  information  are  much  weaker,  so  that  there  exists  a  case  in  which 
cooperation is sustained under perfect information but not under no information 
processing. 
(2)  In a large population,  it is difficult to sustain cooperation under no information 
processing, because it takes a long time for a defector to meet players who have 
met  someone  who  have  met ...  the  player who  was  cheated  by the  defector. 
Given this observation, it is straightforward to show the following  impossibility 
result. 
Proposition 3.  Consider a general matching game defined in Section 2 with uniform 
random matching and no information  processing. Suppose v E V is not the value of a Nash 
equilibrium of  the stage  game.  Then, for  any  8,  v cannot be sustained by a  sequential 
equilibrium  if the population size is large enough. 
The proof is contained in the Appendix. 
(3)  Even when cooperation is sustained, the norm under no information transmission 
has the unfortunate feature that innocent players will necessarily be punished. 
Also, it is fragile in the sense that a little bit of noise ("trembling hands") causes 
complete  breakdown of  cooperation  in the community.  This may be the main 
reason why we do not observe such a norm very often.  Given this point, we feel 
that a norm should be evaluated not only by its equilibrium payoffs, but also by 
its (suitably defined) "robustness". 
Given those  limitations  of  social  norms under no information processing,  we will 
now turn to the case where information is transmitted in a systematic way.  Unlike the 
case of no information transmission, we will show that we can construct equilibria which 
work for any population  size and are robust in a suitably defined sense. 
5.  LOCAL  INFORMATION  PROCESSING 
This  section  is  devoted  to  the  study  of  social  norms  when  there is  a  mechanism  or 
institution which systematically processes some information among community members. 
The processing of information is treated as exogenous,  and it is assumed that information 
is transmitted honestly.  Assuming the existence of such a mechanism our main concern 
here is to identify  a class of simple  and "robust" equilibria which sustain any feasible 
and individually rational outcomes by community enforcement with as little information 
as possible.  To this end, we require a series of desirable properties and show that there 
exists a class of equilibria which satisfy all of them. 
The first requirement is informational decentralization.  We require that both com- 
munity members' decision  making and the update of information can be made without 
the knowledge  of the entire society.  Although computer networks in advanced societies 
may facilitate  instant dissemination  of information about all the community members, 
the presumption here is that such a central coordination device is costly.  We restrict our 
attention to the situations where each agent carries a label and the necessary information 
is transmitted by agents' labels.  Reputation, membership, citizenship, social status, and 
credit cards can be regarded as examples of the labels.  When two players are matched, 
they observe each other's label first and then take some actions.  After that, their labels 
are updated depending  only on  their original labels and actions by a given rule.  Thus, 
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information, and this information structure is referred to as local information  processing. 
Such a mechanism is first introduced by Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1989).  It is 
formally defined as follows. 
Definition 1.  A matching game with local information  processing has the following 
information structure. 
1. A state zi(t) E Zk  is assigned to player i E Nk  (k = 1, 2) at time t. 
2.  When player i and j meet at time t and take actions (ai(t),  aj(t)), their next states 
are determined by 
(zi (t +  1), zj (t + 1)) = T(zi  (t),  zj (t),  ai (t),  aj (t)). 
3.  At time t, player i can observe at least (zi(t),  Z.(i, t)(t))  before choosing his action. 
Although this information structure potentially can convey large amounts of information 
when the community can utilize a large number of labels, we are interested in finding as 
simple a process as possible in this class.  The minimal number of labels will be discussed 
later in this section. 
The second requirement is the simplicity of decision making and the robustness with 
respect to the information structure. In potential applications of the present model, it is 
highly likely that the players may be able to observe something other than the labels of 
their partners, so it is desirable that the equilibrium does  not depend on the fine detail 
of the information structure. In other words, the labels should be sufficient statistics and 
it should summarize all relevant information for agents' decision making. An equilibrium 
in which each labels are sufficient statistics is called straightforward. 
Definition 2.  A sequential equilibrium in a matching game with local information 
processing  is  straightforward if given that all other players' choice  of  actions  depends 
only  on their and their partners' labels,  a player's best response  also depends  only on 
his and his partner's labels, even if he had more information than those; 
aj(t)  =  Jk(Zi(t),  , 0(t))  for  i E Nk,  k =  1, 2. 
In a straightforward equilibrium, each agent does  not need any information other than 
his  and  his  partner's labels,  and this,  together with the  local  information processing, 
represents a strong form of informational decentralization. 
Third, we also require that the equilibrium should be independent of such fine details 
of the game as the matching rule and the size of population.  Since matching in the real 
world is determined in a rather complicated  way, the applicability of the model  would 
be limited if it depended too much on the specification of the matching mechanism.  Note 
that this requirement drastically reduces the information  an agent needs  to  know.  To 
check if the norm is actually an equilibrium, one does  not have to know the number of 
people  in the community, or how people  are matched. 
The  next  requirement is  the  stability  of  the  equilibrium.  As  the  example  in  the 
previous section shows, a community may be able to sustain an efficient outcome under 
limited observability by using harsh punishments, but the equilibrium may be fragile in 
the sense that a small amount of noise  (deviation)  causes the breakdown of the honest 
behaviour in the whole community. On the contrary, if the equilibrium always goes back 
to  the  original payoff point,  it is  robust to  the  mistakes  of  players and  it also  allows 
players to  test  various  actions  in  order to  learn the  social  norm.  A  strong notion  of 
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Definition 3.  An equilibrium sustaining payoffs  v E V is globally stable if for any 
given finite history of actions h, 
lim,,c,  E(vi(t)  I  h) = Vk  for all i E N. 
where vi  (t) is player i's continuation payoffs at t and E ( *  I  h) is the conditional expectation. 
Finally, equilibria should be simple.  For a social norm to be effective, the rule must 
be easy to understand.  Especially when there are newcomers to the community, simplicity 
is crucial for them to learn and follow  the community norm.  An important measure of 
the simplicity of an equilibrium is the number of different actions prescribed to the players 
on  and off the equilibrium path.  Another measure would  be the number of the states 
(#Zk,  k = 1, 2). Those numbers should be small for an equilibrium to be appealing. 
In the rest of this section, it will be shown that those requirements can be achieved 
for some  important classes  of  stage games.  The first class  of  games is those  in which 
only  one type of player has some incentive  problems.  A canonical  example is a credit 
market, where the lender has a choice between lending money or not, and the borrower 
can either pay back or not.  An efficient choice of action is to lend and to pay back, where 
only the borrower can gain by unilateral deviation.  In such cases, it is well known that 
a straightforward and globally stable equilibrium can be constructed to sustain the efficient 
point.  For completeness,  let us define this class of games and briefly state the result. 
Definition 4.  A stage game g has a one-sided incentive  problem for the type-1 player 
at a* E A if a* is a best response to a* and there is a Nash equilibrium in ao in the stage 
game such that g1(a?) < gi(a*).  A symmetric definition applies to the type-2 player. 
Then,  the  following  assertion is  rather obvious;  cooperation  is sustained  because  if  a 
player with the incentive problem cheats, he will simply be punished by his partners for 
a finite time by the one-shot  Nash  Equilibrium. 
Proposition 4.  If g  has a  one-sided incentive problem at  a* E A,  then, under local 
information  processing, there  exists a straightforward  and globally stable equilibrium  support- 
ing a*,  if 6 E (8, 1) for some 5*, and the statement is independent of the matching rule and 
the population size. 
Proof  See Appendix.  II 
The credit bureau is an example  of the possible  application  of the above proposition. 
Credit bureaus are private institutions which keep track of consumers' credit history and 
sell the information to potential lenders, who decide whether to give credit to a consumer 
depending on the record.  A recent paper by D. Klein (1989) analyzes a model of credit 
bureaus.  Another  example  is the  reputation of  a firm which  can potentially  cheat its 
consumers by  supplying  low-quality  goods.  This was  analyzed  by  B. Klein  and  K. B. 
Leffler (1981).  Avner Greif's  (1989)  remarkable analysis  of  medieval trade reveals the 
potential applicability of the idea of community enforcement to the problems of economic 
history before the creation of law enforcement agencies.  He shows some evidence that 
medieval Jewish traders controlled their agents' behaviour through their reputation, and 
again the structure of the model  is characterized by the one-sidedness  of the incentive 
problem  (only  the  agents have the  opportunity to  cheat).  The point is that the simple 
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incentive problem, and is not readily extended to the general case of two-sided incentive 
problems unless we impose some assumptions. 
If both types of players have incentive problems, a more sophisticated treatment is 
necessary.  The  source  of  the  difficulty is to  check the  incentives  of  "honest"  players 
matched together when there are many "guilty" players in the society.7 The second class 
of the games we consider cover those cases and are characterized by the following property. 
(Recall that m represents the mutual minimax point.) 
Assumption (Al).  There exists  r c A such that 
g1(ml,  r2) >  gl(m)  ?  gl(r,  iM2) 
g2(r,  m2)  >  g2(m)?'-g2(m1,  r2). 
This property has the following implications.  We will introduce an equilibrium in which 
two different punishments are used.  If a guilty player meets another guilty player, they 
mutually minimax each other.  If a guilty player and an innocent player are matched, the 
innocent  minimaxes  the  guilty but the  latter is not  supposed  to  minimax the  former; 
instead,  he  "repents" by choosing  an action  r, which is less  harmful for the opponent 
(the strict inequalities  in (Al))  but more costly for himself  (the weak inequalities).  By 
those dual punishments, honest behaviour is enforced for innocent players even though 
they expect to encounter guilty players for a long time in the near future.  The property 
(Al)  is a natural assumption and satisfied by many important games.  Examples in this 
class include the prisoner's dilemma game, where m is defection  and r is cooperation, 
and bilateral trades where the minimax point is no trade and r is interpreted as paying 
a fine to  innocent  players. With those  two  punishments,  we  can construct a "robust" 
equilibrium which sustains any mutually beneficial outcomes. 
Theorem 2.  Under the Assumption (Al),  every point v E V is sustained by a straight- 
forward and globally stable equilibrium  with local information  processing, if 8 E (8*, 1) for 
some 8*,  which is independent of the matching rule and the population size. Furthermore, 
only three actions are prescribed to each player. 
Proof:  The state spaces are finite sets Z1  =  Z2=  Z =  {O, 1,...,  T}.  State 0 indicates 
that the player is innocent  and otherwise  he is guilty.  The  T states for guilty players 
count  the number of  punishments  which  last for  T periods.  Let a*e  A  be the  action 
profile to achieve the designated payoffs  v.  The equilibrium utilizes only three actions, 
a*  ,  m, and  r.  If two  innocent  players are matched, they  choose  the designated  action 
a*. If two guilty players meet, they mutually minimax each other.  If an innocent player 
encounters  a guilty player, the  former minimaxes the  latter but the latter chooses  the 
"repenting" action  r defined in (Al).  That is, for z E Z x Z, 
a*  ifz=(0,0) 
z  (MI,r2)  ifz1=O,z2#O 
(r1, M2)  if z1$ 0,  Z2 =0 
m  if z1, Z2O.- 
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The  state transition  obeys  a simple  rule; any deviation  starts a  T-period punishment. 
For zeZxZ, 
0  if z1  = 0 and a1 = u1(z) 
r(z,  a) =  z, + 1 (mod T+ 1)  if z, 0  0 and a, = ul(z) 
I  if a1  a  (z)$ 
and the symmetric formula applies to type-2 players. 
Then the following  conditions  ensure that type-1 players cannot profitably deviate 
from the prescribed strategies.  Symmetric conditions  apply to type-2 players. 
T)gI~~~~~~~~~~~~~3  (-  g(r,,  M2)  + 8 TVI  0  (3) 
(1-_  T) mm {g1(m1, r2), v1}+S Tv1  ?  (1-  8)v*  + 6[(l  -  T)g1(m)+  Tv1],  (4) 
where  v* =  maxaeA  g1(a).  Inequality  (3)  guarantees  that  a  type-1  player  follows  the 
designated  action  when  he is guilty.  This is seen  as follows.  If a player is guilty, his 
payoff is at least 
x(1 ) + Ax(2)  + *  *  *  + S T- 1x(T)  +(  T +  T+1.  _ 
.)VI,  (5) 
where x(t)  is  either g1(m)  or g1(r,,  M2)  depending  on  the  opponent.  Note  that if all 
other players conform to the equilibrium strategies, every player will be "forgiven" and 
will become  innocent  T periods  ahead,  so that the player will surely be matched with 
honest  players and will receive  v1 after that.  If he deviates,  on the other hand, he can 
earn at most 
0 + 8x(2) +  5 Tx(T)  +  8  Tgl(rl,  M2) 
+ 
(S  T+I  +  5 T+2  ... 
)VI.  (6) 
Note that at T + 1 periods ahead he will get g1(rl,  M2) because his partner will be innocent. 
Thus the difference between (5) and (6) is 
X  (1)  -S  gl  (r,  ,m2)  +  16  TVI  (-  )(rl,  M2)  +  5  VI 
which is non-negative by (3). 
Inequality  (4)  assures innocent  player's  actions  to  be  in  their best  interest.  The 
left-hand side of that inequality is the lower bound of an innocent player's average payoff 
when he conforms to the equilibrium strategy, and the right-hand side is the upper bound 
when he deviates. 
Next,  we will show that (3) and (4) can be satisfied for some  8  and  T. Equation (3) 
is satisfied if 8 T  is close to one, because v >>  0.  If we increase 8 holding 8  T  constant, the 
right-hand side of equation (4) approaches 
(1  8T)g1(m)+  8TV1, 
which is strictly less than the left-hand side of (4), because v, > 0  g1(m) and g1(m1, r2)  > 
gl(m)  (by (Al)). 
Finally, the equilibrium is globally stable because given any history, all players will 
be forgiven and go back to the original payoff point  v after at most  T periods.  11 
Finally, let us examine the minimum number of states (#Zk,  k =  1, 2) to obtain the 
Folk Theorem. When random state transitions are allowed, the informational requirement 
may be further weakened because in that case counting the number of punishments may 
be unnecessary.  Suppose each guilty player has an independent chance of being forgiven 
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the number of  deterministic punishments.  In the standard repeated game, equilibrium 
can be constructed in either way.  In the matching game, however, stochastic punishment 
requires more conditions.  This is because unlike in the deterministic case, a player may 
encounter a guilty player when he is forgiven,  which may destroy the incentives of guilty 
players.  Therefore, an innocent player's payoff when he is matched with a guilty player 
should  not be too  small.  If this is guaranteed, we can reduce the number of the states 
to just two.  In a sense, this is the minimal information necessary to sustain any efficient 
outcomes.  Formally, we need the following  assumption. 
Assumption (A2)  There exists  r E A such that 
gl(ml,  r2)gl(m)  -g,(r,  m2)  O 
g2(r1,  m2)>g2(m)-g2(mI,  r2)?O- 
For  example,  this  assumption  is  satisfied  by  bilateral  trades  in  which  exchange  of 
commodities is mutually beneficial; in that case, m stands for retaining the endowments 
and r for exchange. 
Theorem  3.  When  assumption (A2) is satisfied and stochastic state transition  is allowed, 
any payoff v E  V is sustained by a straightforward  and globally stable equilibrium  under local 
information  processing with two states for each player, if 8 E (8*, 1), and 8* can be chosen 
independently  of the matching rule and the population size. 
Proof.  See Appendix.  || 
Remark. If  there  is  a  random  event  which  is  observable  to  all  the  members  in  the 
community, then forgiving guilty players can be coordinated.  That is, all guilty players 
can be forgiven at once based on the outcome  of the publicly observable event.  When 
this  is  possible,  a  guilty  player  always  expects  to  be  matched  with  innocent  players 
whenever he is forgiven, and therefore assumption (Al)  is sufficient to establish the same 
result as Theorem 2. 
6.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
In this paper, we have shown how informal sanctions by community members can induce 
desirable behaviour in infrequent trades.  Specifically,  it is shown that a simple  action 
rule and local information transmission are sufficient to sustain any mutually beneficial 
outcomes  under weak conditions. 
Technically,  our model is an extension  of the theory of repeated games to the case 
of matching games.  Early literature on the study of repeated matching games includes 
R. Rosenthal (1979),  and R. Rosenthal and H. Landau (1979). The former deals with a 
model  with  adverse  selection  and  proves  the  existence  of  Markov equilibrium  when 
players observe their partners' last actions. The latter analyzes examples of equilibria in 
a bargaining game with a specific local information transmission mechanism, which they 
call reputation.  The attempt to generalize the  Folk Theorem of repeated games to the 
case of matching games was initiated by P. Milgrom, D. North and B. Weingast (1990), 
and  M.  Okuno-Fujiwara  and  A.  Postlewaite  (1989).  The  former  analyzed  concrete 
examples of information transmission mechanisms and the latter introduced the notion KANDORI  SOCIAL  NORMS  AND  COMMUNITY  ENFORCEMENT  77 
of  local  information  processing.  Both of them, however,  mainly deal with the infinite 
population case to avoid potentially complicated problems of incentives on off-equilibrium 
paths. Our paper shows that such problems can be resolved in a simple way if the stage 
game  satisfies a certain weak condition.  Equilibria constructed in our paper work for 
any population  size  and any matching rule, and are robust to  changes in information 
structures. 
Perhaps the  most  important question  which  is  unanswered  by the  present paper 
concerns  the  way  in  which  the  information  transmission  postulated  in  our  model  is 
implemented.  Three important problems arise in that respect. 
1. What is the cost of information transmission? 
2.  Who pays the cost? 
3.  How  are  proper  incentives  maintained  in  the  information  transmission 
mechanism? 
Papers by Milgrom et al.  (1990)  and Klein  (1988)  analyse some of those  problems for 
such institutions as "law merchants" during the early middle ages and credit bureaus in 
modern times, but general theoretical examination  of those  problems is yet to be done. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 1 and Lemma.  By the Principle of Dynamic Programming, we have only to check that 
one-shot deviations from the strategy are unprofitable after any history (see Abreu (1988)).  The condition that 
a one-shot  deviation from the equilibrium path is unprofitable is 
?,  708=o  Ve1A'p(I +g).  (*) 
The left-hand side is the payoff from cooperating forever, and the right-hand side is the payoff when the player 
defects forever.  The expression e1A'p is the probability of meeting a c-type at time t given that the player was 
the first person to deviate at time 0.  Since the equilibrium requires that a player play defection  after he has 
defected,  he receives payoff (1+ g)  if he is matched with a c-type, and gets zero payoff otherwise.  Summing 
up the geometric sequence  shows that condition  (*) is equivalent to inequality (1). 
To show the unprofitability of deviation from an off-equilibrium path (i.e. playing c after observing any 
defection  including  his own),  we need  in principle to specify  a player's belief  on  X,  (the number of type-d 
players),  because  we  are interested in  a  sequential  equilibrium.  Rather than  following  this  procedure,  we 
identify  a sufficient condition  for a one-shot  deviation from an off-equilibrium path to be unprofitable under 
any consistent beliefs.  This not only avoids complication  but also guarantees that the equilibrium is robust to 
refinements of sequential equilibria. The condition we are going to use is that a one-shot deviation from playing 
d forever is unprofitable for a d-type player given any number of d-types  (i.e. X, = k for all k = 2, 3,  M); 
Z:obekA'p  (I+g)  ?()(-  I+bZ  obek  eBA  p (1I+g). 
(M -  I  M  (  MI) 
The left-hand side is the payoff from playing d forever when there are k d-type  players including the player 
himself,  and  right-hand side  is  what the  player receives  when  he  plays  c today  and then  plays  d  forever; 
(M -  k)/(M  -  1) and (k -  1)/(M  -  1) are the probabilities of meeting type-c  and type-d  players respectively, 
and  ekB is the distribution of the number of type d players tomorrow given that there are k d-types and one 
of them (the player) deviates to play c today.  This can be manipulated to get inequality (2). 
Given M  and g, the equilibrium conditions  (1) and (2) can be satisfied for large 8  and I because lim8_1 
(I -M8A)-lp  <c.  This is seen as follows.  Notice  that 
(I  -  8A)-lp  =0  b'A'p  =  I'  0 b/Ap  = (I  -  5A)-lp, 
where A is a matrix obtained by replacing the last column of A by zeros.  Such replacement is justified because 
X, = M is the absorbing state and the Mth element of p is zero.  Given this, we have only to show the existence 78  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
of (I -  A)'.  Since the number of d-types never declines, A is upper-triangular  and so is (I -  A).  The determinant 
of an upper-triangular matrix is the products of its diagonal elements, which are all strictly positive for (I -  A).  11 
Proof of Proposition 3.  Without loss of generality, suppose the type-I player has an incentive to deviate 
from v, and suppose the gain from defecting is d, > 0.  Let A, = maxa,A  g1(a)  -minaeA  g,(a).  Given a strategy, 
suppose  V and  V' be the continuation payoffs for a type-I player when he conforms to a strategy and deviates 
from it respectively (a symmetric argument applies to type-2 players).  Then, for sufficiently large n, V -  V' < d, 
and therefore the only equilibrium is the repetition of a one-shot  Nash  equilibrium.  This is because 
?'I  "t  , 00  3  ^*tmin  12', l,n}  asn  . 
n 
The inequality is explained  as follows.  Let I, be the set of players whose behaviour at T+ t is affected by the 
defection at time T. If player i is the defector at T, I, = {i,  s(i, T)} and for t>  1, I, = {Il  e I,-,  orj  = ,u(k, t-i1) 
for some  k E It-1}.  The number of such players is maximal when all members of  I, are matched with players 
in N\I,,  so that an upper bound of #I,  is min {2', 2n}. Hence min {2',  n} is an upper bound of the number 
of type-2 players in I,  so that min {2',  n}/n  is an upper bound of the probability for the type-I  defector to 
meet a type-2 player in I, at T+  t.  11 
Proof of Proposition 4.  Suppose the type-i  players have an incentive problem, and let Z1,  =  {0, 1,...,T} 
be the state space for type-I  and let type-2 players' state be identically equal to zero. The state transition rule 
is the following. 
~0a) ~(0,  0)  if a,=  a*, 
(1, 0)  otherwise 
and  r(k, 0) = k+  1 (mod  T+  1) for k = 1, . . .,  T and for all a E A.  The action choice is given by 
ak,  a*  ifk=0*  I 
ao  otherwise 
Thus, after a deviation, a type-1 player is punished for T periods by one-shot Nash equilibrium. Type-2 players 
have no incentive to deviate because their future payoffs are independent of their actions and they are always 
taking one-shot best responses.  If T and 8  are sufficiently large, the loss caused by the T periods punishment 
becomes  greater than the gain from a one-shot  deviation, and therefore the type-2 conforms to the prescribed 
strategy.  11 
Proof of Theorem 3.  The state spaces are Z, =  =  Z  =  {0,  1},  where 0 indicates innocence  and 1 means 
that the player is guilty.  Let a* E A be the action profile which achieves  v. The action rule is, for z E Z, 
(a*  if z=(0,0) 
(m,,  r2)  if  zI =?,  Z2= 
(rl,m2)  if zl=i,z2=0 
m  if z=  Z2 =  I 
The state transition is determined as follows.  If z, (t) = 0 and player i does  not deviate, then z, (t + 1) = 0,  and 
if he deviates, z, (t + 1) = 1.  When zi  (t) = 1, z, (t + 1) = I  if he deviates, and if he conforms, 
I  with probability p 
z(t+  1)  0  with probability I-p. 
We will check the incentives of type-I  players.  Symmetric arguments apply to type-2 players.  When a type-1 
player is guilty, his total payoff is 
rI  =  X()+k=2  (8p)k  (x(k)  -  u(k))  +  28k-1u(k), 
where 
u(k) = 0(k)g,(m,,  r2)  + (1 -  0(k))v, 
x(k)  = 0(k)gl(m)  + (1 -  0(k))g,(rj,  M, 
and 0(k)  is the probability of meeting a guilty opponent after k periods.  Note that when the player is forgiven, 
his payoff changes from x(k)  to u(k).  If he deviates, he earns at most 
11=O+  Ax(2)+ 82(px(3) + (I -p)u(3))  +.* 
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The difference is 
-H  = xMl  + (pSa-  ) Y,k  =2 (8p  ((k)  - u(k)). 
Note  that  x(k)  -  u(k) =  6(k)(gl(m))  -  gl(ml,  r2))  + (1 -  0(k))(gl(r,  iM2)  -  Vl)  <g1(r,  iM2)  by  v1 >0  and 
Assumption  (A2).  Therefore, 
HII-I>x()+  lP X g1(r1,  M2) ->x(l) -g1(r,  m2)  0 
as St 1 with Sp  E (0, 1) held constant.  Thus we have shown that any deviation is unprofitable for guilty players. 
When a player is innocent, his total payoff is 
U = E- 
k-l u(k), 
and one-shot  deviation earns at most  U'=  maxaeA g1(a)+I1'.  Therefore, 
U -  U' =  (u(1)  -maxaEA  gl(a)  + 8'k=2  (8p) k2(u(k)  -  x(k)). 
Since  u(k)-x(k)>O,  this is positive if  8 and 8p are close to 1.  11 
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